We will call a game a reachable (pure strategy) equilibria game if starting from any strategy by any player, by a sequence of best-response moves we are able to reach a (pure strategy) equilibrium. We give a characterization of all¯nite strategy space duopolies with reachable equilibria. We describe some applications of the su±cient conditions of the characterization.
Consider a game G with 2 players with¯nite strategic spaces 1; : : : ; n 1 and 1; : : : ; n 2 respectively. We de¯ne a directed bipartite graph, called the b-r graph, representing the game as follows: Let G = (N 1 ; N 2 ) be a directed bipartite graph with n 1 nodes in N 1 and n 2 nodes in N 2 and an arc (i; j) if j is a best response to player 1's strategy i. We will call the arcs of G best response arcs or b-r arcs. Note that every node can have multiple outgoing b-r arcs, and has at least one such outgoing b-r arc (as we assume each player has at least one best response to every strategy in the other player's strategy space).
An equilibrium is a pair of arcs of the form (i; j) and (j; i). We will say G is a graph with reachable equilibria if every node in G has a directed path to an equilibrium pair of arcs. In the game, this would correspond to being able to reach an equilibrium by a sequence of best responses starting from any strategy.
Main Result
Note that the nodes of N 1 and N 2 can be labeled 1; : : : ; n 1 and 1; : : : ; n 2 any way we want. It does not a®ect whether G has an equilibrium or not in any way. Any such labeling forms a linear order on the sets N 1 and N 2 respectively. For a given such labeling we will say two b-r arcs (i 1 ; i 2 ) and (j 1 ; j 2 ) are said to cross if i 1 < j 1 and j 2 < i 2 in the linear order de¯ned by the labeling. Given a labeling of N 1 and N 2 we de¯ne a subgraph H of G, called the lowest b-r arcs graph, given by each player's lowest best response strategy in the linear ordering of the labeling to each strategy of the other player. For example, if in a particular labeling of the nodes, player 2's best response to player 1's move of i is j k 1 < ¢ ¢ ¢ < j km , then H will contain just the one b-r arc (i; j k 1 ). Note that H represents a particular choice of best response functions from the best response correspondences represented by G.
Our main result is the following:
Theorem 1 G is a reachable equilibria game if and only if there exists a labeling (i.e., linear ordering) of N 1 and N 2 of the b-r graph G such that the arcs in H, the lowest b-r graph, are non-crossing.
Before we give a proof of the theorem, we will make a few comments on its implications: ² Theorem 1's interpretation should be that in order to prove existence of equilibria in a duopoly with¯nite strategy spaces, in most cases, it would be su±cient to just try and¯nd an appropriate linear order and prove that there are no crossing arcs. Theorem 1 also tells us that we can limit ourselves to considering only the lowest b-r arcs.
² While Theorem 1 applies only to duopolies, it could also be viewed, in the negative sense, as a result on oligopolies: i.e., if one cannot¯nd such linear orderings of the strategy spaces for the 2-payer version of a given oligopoly game, it is unlikely we will be able to prove the existence of a reachable equilibria for the given oligopoly game. ² For equilibria that are not reachable, it is unlikely that one would be able to say something in the style of Theorem 1. Consider the game given by the graph in Figure 1 . The equilibrium is not reachable and there is no non-crossing labeling possible.
² For continuous but bounded strategy spaces, a su±cient discretization can make the theorem applicable.
The su±ciency part is very easy to prove (indeed, existence follows directly from Tarski's¯xed point theorem applied to linear ordered sets; but the following elementary graph-theoretical argument illustrates the concept of reachable equilibria): Consider the non-crossing labeling and starting from any node of N 1 , follow a sequence of best-responses given by the subgraph H. Since the number of nodes is¯nite, either we end up at an equilibrium pair of arcs, or we end up doubling back and creating a crossing pair of arcs, a contradiction.
(only if):
The necessity is the surprising part, and also the more di±cult.
Partition the set of nodes of G by the following process. Start o® with an equilibrium pair (i; j) (call it root equilibrium pair) and consider the set of nodes S 1 consisting of all nodes from which we can reach i or j (basically set of all nodes with directed paths in G to i or j). Remove all the nodes of S 1 and repeat (say k times) till there are no more nodes left. Since G is a reachable equilibria graph, it should be clear that S 1 [ ¢ ¢ ¢ [ S k forms a partition of N 1 ; N 2 . Moreover, note that there is no b-r arc in G that goes from a node in S j to a node in S i if i < j. Now compress the nodes in S 1 ; : : : ; S k to form a new graph K with nodes f1; : : : ; kg corresponding to S 1 ; : : : ; S k . Notice that there cannot be cycles in this graph K by the following argument: Suppose there was a cycle. Pick the lowest indexed node in the cycle. It has an incoming arc from a node with a higher number which would contradict the fact that there is no b-r arc in G that goes from a node in S j to a node in S i if i < j. So K is an acyclic graph, and by a basic result in graph theory, the nodes of K have a labeling such that for every arc (i; j), i < j. We will just assume without loss of generality that S i ; i = 1; : : : ; k are ordered as such. Call this the ordering of the sets of the partition. Now consider the partition S i ; i = 1; : : : ; k. We will show that within each of these sets of the partition, we can order the nodes appropriately (ordering within the sets of the partition). This combined with the above ordering of the sets of the partition will give us the appropriate linear ordering that we seek.
Consider a set S 2 fS 1 ; : : : ; S k g. Order the elements of S by the following algorithm: Let T (0) be the subgraph consisting of the root equilibrium pair of S, (i; j). These two nodes will be the lowest ranked nodes in S \ N 1 and S \ N 2 respectively.
Consider the steps in the following algorithm. At stage m, T (m) will be a subgraph with a linear order of nodes in T (m) \ N 1 and T (m) \ N 2 . Moreover, the set T (m) will be \closed" in the sense that it will be a reachable equilibria graph, and the lowest arc subgraph of T (m) has no crossing arcs (indeed, T (m) will have exactly one out going arc per node, so when we say lowest arc subgraph, it is with respect to S) . Trivially, this is true for T (0) . Given T (m) , we construct T (m+1) by the following process: Let f1; : : : ; p m g be the nodes in T (m) \ N 1 . For i = 1; : : : ; p m , pick all j = 2 T (m+1) and arc (j; i) 2 S and add them to the set T (m+1) . Moreover give them a linear order according to the order in which they were added to T (m+1) . Similarly, for f1; : : : ; q m g, the nodes in T (m) \ N 2 . That brings us the end of stage m + 1. Repeat till m = M where all the nodes of set S are included in T (M) .
Clearly T (m+1) is a reachable equilibria subgraph if T (m) is, as we can reach the root equilibrium pair of S from the newly added nodes. It only remains to show that we do not create any crossing lowest b-r arcs going from stage m to m + 1. Suppose we have added arc (i 1 ; i 2 ) in building T (m+1) , and say it crosses with (j 1 ; j 2 ) 2 T (m+1) . First, (i 1 ; i 2 ) is a lowest b-r arc as if i 1 had an arc to a node in 1; : : : ; i 2 ¡ 1, it would have been added sooner. Next, if it crossed (j 1 ; j 2 ) 2 T (m+1) , it means that the current linear order (the order of the nodes of T (m+1) just prior to adding (i 1 ; i 2 )) has i 1 > j 1 , as (j 1 ; j 2 ) existed in T (m+1) before (i 1 ; i 2 ); and as it is crossing, i 2 < j 2 . But if i 2 < j 2 , (i 1 ; i 2 ) should have been added to T (m+1) earlier than (j 1 ; j 2 ), a contradiction. Figure 2 shows this construction process.
Repeating this for each set S 2 fS 1 ; : : : ; S k g, we have an ordering for each fS 1 ; : : : ; S k g and subgraphs fT 1 µ S 1 ; : : : ; T k µ S k g that represent the subgraph of lowest non-crossing b-r arcs within the subsets of the partition.
Finally, there remains the task of stitching together the orders within the sets of the partition with the orders of the sets of the partition. For this, just consider the lexicographic order on node i as [s i ; t i ], where s i is the rank of the set in the partition containing node i, and the t i is the rank of the node within the set of the partition. This lexicographic ordering creates a linear ordering of the nodes of N 1 and N 2 . We have to show that the statement of the theorem holds for this lexicographic ordering. We will do this by showing that H, the lowest b-r subgraph of G in this lexicographic ordering is exactly
Arcs of the form (i; j) 2 S l \ G and (i; j) = 2 T l , clearly are not lowest b-r arcs. Suppose an arc (i; j) is such that i 2 S n and j 2 S l . Let (i; t) be the lowest b-r arc in T n .
Then in the compressed graph K, there would have been an arc (n; l), implying n < l in the order of the partitions. Hence, (i; j) cannot be a lowest b-r arc because in the lexi- cographic ordering, node t would have a lower rank than node j.
2 Theorem 1 does not provide any hint about uniqueness. Indeed, giving useful, nontrivial, characterizations of uniqueness seems more di±cult than of existence. We do not have even strong su±cient conditions, although given the simple nature of the graphs, we are optimistic in this regard.
We give below some rather weak and obvious conditions.
Corollary 1
The game G has an unique equilibrium if there is a unique best-response for each strategy of the other player, G is connected, and there is a linear order such that the b-r graph H has non-crossing arcs.
In the above, unique equilibrium means the game has a single pure-strategy equilibrium.
The game can have multiple equilibria but a unique reachable equilibrium, which we de¯ne as an equilibrium that is reachable from any strategy by any player by a sequence of bestresponse moves.
The following proposition will also be used in our later application:
Proposition 1 Let the set of nodes S 1 of G be such that no node in S 1 is a best response arc to any strategy of¯rm 2, and similarly S 2 for¯rm 2. Suppose G0 = N 1 ¡ S 1 ; N 2 ¡ S 2 have a labeling such that the arcs of the lowest b-r graph of this labeling, H0, are non-crossing. Then there exists a labeling of G such that its lowest b-r graph H has non-crossing arcs. a labeling of G Proof Consider a node i in S 1 . Let j be the best-response node in N 2 ¡ S 2 corresponding to i. Let b ¡1 (j) be the node of¯rm 1 such that the best response arc in H0 of¯rm 1's b ¡1 (j) strategy has the largest label less than or equal to the label of j. Give node i the label of b ¡1 (j) plus one, and add one to all the labels of nodes with labels greater than that of b ¡1 (j). Repeat this procedure for all nodes in S 1 and S 2 . The relative position of the nodes of N 1 ¡ S 1 and N 2 ¡S 2 are not changed and the new arcs do not cross with any existing lowest b-r arcs. 2
Supermodularity
Equilibria in supermodular games is a well-studied topic with a wide variety of applications. This says that if the payo® functions for both players (note, the statement is with respect to the pay o® functions and not the best response functions) are supermodular and satis¯es some properties, then the game has an equilibrium.
Here we repeat the de¯nitions from Vives [10] (see [10] for de¯nitions of lattice etc.). A game is supermodular if for each player i, the strategy space A i is a complete lattice, the payo® function ¼ i is upper semicontinuous and supermodular in player i's strategies a i , i.e.,
for a¯xed set of strategies of all other players a ¡i , and displays an increasing di®erences property in (a i ; a ¡i ). The increasing di®erences property is as follows (again from Vives [10] , but specialized to linearly ordered sets): Let N 1 and N 2 be two¯nite sets. The function
is increasing in i for all j 1¸j2 . Topkis [9] showed that all supermodular games have an equilibrium. For the linearly ordered case of course, Equation 1 is redundantly true for all pay-o® functions, so we need to consider only the increasing di®erences property.
For our discrete,¯nite strategy space case, supermodularity and the the increasing differences property implies non-crossing arcs, but our results do not require supermodularity. Essentially the increasing di®erences property says (in our graph-theoretical terminology) Figure 3: The graph on the left represents the payo®s for player 2 and the one on the right, those for player 1. Game has an equilibrium, but payo® functions (under any ordering) do not have the increasing di®erences property (the numbers next to the nodes represent
that for a¯xed ordering if (i 1 ; i 2 ) and (j 1 ; j 2 ) are crossing arcs, then 1 is better o® using (i 1 ; j 2 ) and (j 1 ; i 2 ) instead, so no best-response arcs cross. This is then shown to be su±cient for the game to have a pure strategy equilibrium.
Our result is slightly more general (albeit only for¯nite, linearly ordered structures) in the sense, we do not specify why the game should not have crossing b-r arcs. Figure 3 shows an example where the payo® functions do not have the increasing differences property (under any linear ordering), yet there is an equilibrium. Our su±ciency condition however, would imply the existence of an equilibrium, because we consider only non-crossing of best-response functions. Whether something like this example will come to pass in a real \interesting" application, we do not know yet, and till we encounter some actual application, we will hold o® judgment on the degree of generalization this new framework provides. In any case, we see the converse direction as the more surprising and interesting result of this research.
Applications
Although Theorem 1 does not specify a priori what the linear ordering of the strategies should be, in many applications the natural ordering suggested by the problem works. Indeed, this is the case for the applications in Lippman and McCardle [5] , Netessine and Shumsky [6] (see Talluri and van Ryzin [8] ) and Cachon [3] .
Discrete and¯nite strategy spaces also come up naturally in applications (and not just as approximations to continuous models. Indeed the problems in [5] , [6] and [3] are more naturally stated in terms of discrete strategies in units of inventory).
We give below an application from revenue management where a continuous approximation is not possible, but equilibria can be proved very easily using our graph-theoretic techniques.
Assume that two airlines sell their inventory for their°ights (one°ight each, called resource) at multiple prices (a product is a reservation for future usage of one unit of the airline capacity; in addition multiple products are created by sale restrictions|such as cancellation and advance purchase restrictions. Customers self-select their products.).
Firms¯x the prices for the duration of the sale of their inventories, and only change allocations to the di®erent products. This is how quantity based revenue management is practiced in the airline industry (besides hotels, railway and other industries). Such static, xed, prices are preferred when prices have to be advertised, or resources are sold based on reservations, or it is otherwise costly to change prices.
In our model time is discrete and there are T units of time till the usage of the resource. The resources of both¯rms are consumed simultaneously at time T . Bookings happen during the intervals 0 to T with at most one arrival during each period. A consumer arrives in a period, observes the available choices of the two¯rms and then, based on the prices and attributes of the fare products, either decides to buy one of the products of one of the¯rms, or decide not to purchase any of the available products (let 0 represent this no-purchase alternative). We assume a multinomial logit model (see Ben-Akiva and Lerman [2] ), with a no-purchase alternative, as the consumer's choice rule. In each period there is a probability of a consumer arrival. If a consumer does not purchase in a period, he disappears; i.e., he does not reappear in a later period. So, the consumer is passive and does not play any strategic game to maximize his utility.
Since the choice rule is multinomial logit, a customer's probability of choosing an available product j of¯rm i, when¯rm i o®ers the set A i can be represented for convenience by:°i
where the weights w 1 j and w 2 j could possibly be functions of the prices p 1 j and p 2 j and other attributes, and w 0 is the weight of the no-purchase alternative.
Firms in turn start o® with capacities of C 1 and C 2 units of inventory and n 1 and n 2 set of products respectively. They¯x the prices of the products p 1 1 ; p 1 2 ; : : : ; p 1 n 1 and p 2 1 ; p 2 2 ; : : : ; p 2 n 2 and keep them¯xed throughout the booking period. At the beginning of each period, each¯rm makes available a subset of its fare products. So note that even though prices are¯xed, the¯rms can e®ectively change the prices by deciding on what subset they make available simultaneously. All in all, while one can criticize the speci¯city of the logit functional form, this model captures both customer choice and the dynamics of a revenue management problem quite accurately. There are two informational assumptions one can make:¯rms do not observe each other's remaining capacity;¯rms observe remaining capacity. In either case, if a¯rm sells out all capacity, then it can only o®er a null set, and its competitor realizes that it has sold out.
Observable capacities
In this case, the state space includes competitor's capacities. So the reaction function is based on one's own remaining capacity, competitor's remaining capacity, and competitor's current o®er set.
It is shown in Talluri and van Ryzin [7] that the multinomial logit customer choice model, for the monopoly case, has the nested-by-fares property which means that each¯rm needs to consider only complete sets, that is, for¯rm 1, sets of the form f1; 2; : : : ; k 1 g, for k 1 = 1; 2; : : : ; n 1 and for¯rm 2, sets of the form f1; 2; : : : ; k 2 g, for k 2 = 1; 2; : : : ; n 2 . We will assume here that the strategy spaces are indeed these complete sets. In practice, most airlines use nested controls and nested o®er sets. We will represent such complete sets compactly as A k 1 and A k 2 respectively, and the collection of all such sets N 1 for¯rm 1 and N 2 for¯rm 2. We will say, set A k 1 < A k 2 if k 1 < k 2 or as the sets are nested,
The value function for¯rm 1 at time t given¯rm 2 o®ers A 2 is given by the following:
where, V t+1 (¢; ¢) is the equilibrium revenue-to-go from period t + 1 onwards.
There are two things to note about (2): (i) It is de¯ned at time t only if there is an equilibrium from t till T . (ii) If there are multiple equilibria, we exogenously assume that rm 1 starts o® with a speci¯c strategy (say the strategy labeled 1 and by a sequence of best responses, both¯rms will end up at an equilibrium (i.e., the value function is again uniquely speci¯ed).
The value function for¯rm 2 is de¯ned similarly. We will let V 1 t (x 1 ; x 2 jA 1 ; A 2 ) denotē rm 1's revenue if it uses A 1 to react to¯rm 2's A 2 .
While Equation 2 looks complicated, in words, it just says, given¯rm 2 chooses A 2 to o®er,¯rm 1's revenue-to-go function is current period's revenue plus the revenue depending on what state they end up at the end of the period (by no sale, sale for¯rm 1, or sale for rm 2).
First of all, let us rewrite Equation 2, using the fact that
as:
For simplicity we will just write g(A 1 jx 1 ; x 2 ) as g(A 1 ), whenever there is no room for confusion. Notice that g(¢) for¯rm 1 is independent of the strategies of¯rm 2, and vice versa for¯rm 2.
The following are intuitive and not hard to show rigorously:
As prices p i j are decreasing in j, as¯rm i o®ers larger sets, the function g(A i ) increases monotonically¯rst and then decreases monotonically (that is, it is unimodal). The function g(A i ) can also be negative. It could be the case that g(¢) is negative for all strategies of¯rm i. Figure 4 shows the two possibilities for¯rm i, where ¹ G i is the set that has the maximum value of g, and if the¯rm. We will call the case where g( ¹ G i )¸0 as Case I, and Case II when g(
Form an equilibrium bipartite graph with n 1 nodes on one side and n 2 nodes on the other side, with each node corresponding to each of the complete sets ( Figure 7) . The order of the nodes will be speci¯ed later depending on whether the¯rms are in Case I or Case II. For a given ordering any time t,¯rm 1 o®ers the set k 1 ,¯rm 2 has one (or more) best-response sets k 2 . Represent each such best-response as an arc that originates at node k 1 and terminates at the node that represents¯rm 2's best response set. Similarly for all sets of¯rm 1 and vice versa for the best responses of¯rm 1 to the o®er sets of¯rm 2. So we have a directed bipartite graph where each node has at least one outgoing arc (and possibly zero, one or multiple incoming arcs).
Lemma 1 If a¯rm, say¯rm 1, is in Case I, a set
, is never the best responses to any strategy choice of the competitor.
Proof
Let A 1 be such that g(A 1 ) is negative. Then,
as the left hand-side is negative and the right-hand side is positive. Note that the fact that g( ¹ G 1 ) is positive is essential for the above identity to hold. By adding the appropriate terms (not involving A 1 or ¹ G 1 ),
2 Lemma 2 If a¯rm, say¯rm 1, is in Case II, and if A 1 l < ¹ G 1 , then node l is not a best response for any strategy of the other¯rm.
Let A 2 be a strategy choice of¯rm 2.
as we are in Case II where all g(¢) are negative).
or in other words, A 1 l is not the best response function. So, if¯rm 2 o®ers the complete set k 2 , then¯rm 1's best response is k 1 and if¯rm 2 o®ers the complete set l 2 , then¯rm 1's best response is l 1 . Because the customer's choice rule is the multinomial logit, this means that:
Similarly, when¯rm 2 o®ers l 2 ,
Now note that since k 1 > l 1 , the denominator of the left-hand side of (4) is greater than that of the right-hand side and that this implies g(A 1 Consider now, g(A 1
As there are no¯rm 2's terms in the numerator, and since l 2 > k 2 , we have the following inequality,
By adding appropriate terms on both sides (not involving the strategy choices of either rm), we have proved:
But this contradicts the fact that if¯rm 2 o®ers l 2 , the best-response set for¯rm 1 is l 1 |it is in fact k 1 > l 1 .
Both¯rms are in Case II: Order the strategy space of¯rm 1 by decreasing sizes as A 1 n 1 ; : : : ; ¹ G 1 and for¯rm 2 by increasing sizes as ¹ G 2 ; : : : ; A 2 n 2 respectively. Suppose there exist two crossing arcs in this ordering. So let l 1 < k 1 and l 2 > k 2 , and the two lowest crossing b-r arcs for¯rm 1 be (k 2 ; k 1 ) and (l 2 ; l 1 ).
As¯rm 1 has the decreasing order, g is monotonically increasing, from A 1
Now if x=y > z=w and x · z < 0, y > 0; w > 0, then x=(y ¡ v) > z=(w ¡ v) for any constant v > 0. As¯rm 2's nodes are ordered by increasing nested sets,
which implies
But this contradicts the fact that A 1 k 1 is the best response to A 2
As similar argument holds for crossing arcs as a response to strategies of¯rm 1. 108.18
Then the payo® and best-response arcs are as given in Figure 5 , and it can be seen that there is a cycle and no equilibrium, even for the multinomial logit choice function.
So even though the single-period problem always has an equilibrium (Anderson et al. [1] ), the competitive game over a¯nite number of periods, may end up having no equilibrium. Notice that this is not a repeated game|the dynamic program has strong intertemporal relationships, and the parameters of the game changes over time.
We next give some conditions on the choice model parameters that guarantees existence of an equilibrium. De¯ne for A k > A l ,
which represents the weighted average price for the products from k to l.
Proposition 2
If suppose the parameters of the choice model satisfy, for i = 1; 2, for any A i k ; A i l :
Then there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the subsets that each¯rm o®ers at every time interval t.
Proof From Lemma 3 it only remains to show the non-crossing property when one¯rm is in Case II and the other¯rm is in Case I.
We will show that if a¯rm is in Case II, then if the weights and prices satisfy (9), the only best response for the¯rm, for any strategy of the other¯rm, is to o®er set ¹ G i .
Say¯rm 1 is in Case II. Let A 1 k be a best-response to¯rm 2's strategy A 2 k , and
Therefore,
which implies,
or,
Note that there is at least one A i l with h(A i l )¸0 as there is at least one p i j¸¢ . If h(A i l )¸0 for all o®er sets of¯rm i, let ¹ G i be just the largest o®er set, f1; 2; : : : ; n i g. So the denominator of (10) is less than zero.
From (9) and the fact that ¢ > ±, the numerator is greater than 0, so the right hand side is less than zero, while the left hand side is greater than 0. So, A 1 k cannot be a best-response arc.
So, order the nodes of both¯rm 1 and 2 by increasing order. (The b-r arcs do not cross (that argument that¯rm 2's b-r arcs do not cross are the same as in Lemma 3, for the case where both¯rms are in Case I). So by Theorem 1, there exists an equilibrium. 2
The condition for Proposition 2 holds for instance, when w 0 = 0. That is, if a customer arrives in a period, he is assumed to make a purchase if one of the¯rms is o®ering inventory.
In the model of Dudey [4] both¯rms can observe each other's capacities, and the customer in each period will always purchase from one of the two¯rms (equivalent to w 0 = 0). So the no-purchase option plays a crucial role indeed|its relative magnitude determines whether we have an equilibrium in the game or not. Figure 6 shows the intuition behind why modeling the no-purchase option introduces the instability into the game under certain circumstances.
While Example 1 is somewhat discouraging, it is not indicative of a non-equilibrium in many interesting cases, such as the following: if say the two¯rms have equal capacities, identical products, and customers, then will we see equilibrium in the o®er sets? Example 1 is not applicable and it is possible that one can derive conditions on ¢ and ± to show the existence of an equilibrium. Indeed Example 1 does not even conclusive for the general case|it does not show that the ¢ and ± used actually arise in a dynamic game. 
Unobservable capacities
This case holds in the airline case, where a¯rm can observe the competitor's available subset but cannot observe its remaining capacity.
We have brie°y discussed the symmetric case earlier, where the¯rms have identical capacities, products and consumers are indi®erent to the two¯rms. In the presence of a no-purchase alternative, it is not even clear that this game has an equilibrium. However, on average, we would expect both¯rms to have identical capacities at any given point of time. So Proposition 3 applies and we would expect to see an equilibrium. Indeed, if capacities are not observable,¯rms may just assume that the rival's capacity is the same as theirs and solve their dynamic programs|this would lead to an equilibrium strategy for both players, as both would be in Case I together or in Case II together.
We consider another case where both¯rm's essentially ignore the competitor's capacity. The value functions for¯rm 1 at time t given¯rm 2 o®ers A 2 can then be given by the following:
Similarly for¯rm 2.
Firms react to the o®ered subsets, and do not consider competitor's capacity. This is a considerable simpli¯cation. It is possible that they may be making some forecasts on competitor remaining capacity, learn from competitor's actions in a Bayesian/learning framework etc. Such complicated modeling is beyond the scope of this paper, as here, we are just trying to illustrate an application of the no-crossing technique. 1 Proposition 3 Let l 1 < k 1 and l 2 > k 2 . Then the lowest b-r graph cannot have the two b-r arcs for¯rm 1 (k 2 ; k 1 ) and (l 2 ; l 1 ). Similarly for¯rm 2.
Proof
Suppose there exist two such arcs. So, if¯rm 2 o®ers the complete set k 2 , then¯rm 1's best response is k 1 and if¯rm 2 o®ers the complete set l 2 , then¯rm 1's best response is l 1 . Because the customer's choice rule is the multinomial logit, this means that: 
Now note that since k 1 > l 1 , the denominator of the left-hand side of (12) is greater than that of the right-hand side and that this implies 
But this contradicts the fact that if¯rm 2 o®ers l 2 , the best-response set for¯rm 1 is l 1 |it is in fact k 1 > l 1 . 2 So, again, by Theorem 1, we have proved the following:
Theorem 2 There exists a Nash equilibrium in the subsets that each¯rm o®ers at every time interval t.
We do not exclude multiple equilibria. Assume that¯rms always choose the highest labeled equilibria (open the most number of classes). This would be a reasonable assumption if both¯rms start o® with their largest sets and converge to an equilibrium based on observations of the other's moves.
Then one can de¯ne the concept of equilibrium marginal value as ¼ i = V i t+1 (x ¡ 1) ¡ V i t+1 (x) where both¯rms o®er their equilibrium sets during periods t + 1; : : : ; T . Let A ¼ i be the complete sets de¯ned by these equilibrium marginal values (that is composed of all the products with prices higher than ¼ i ). Then during period t, there exist equilibrium subsets of A ¼ i , so the T -period revenue management game has a (subgame perfect) equilibrium.
Dynamic Pricing and Lowest-Open-Fare Choice Model
The results of this Section also extend to a choice model where customers choose the lowest priced available product in the o®er sets. If there is a single segment (as we assumed here) of customers, then this is equivalent to¯rms o®ering a single price in each time period, i.e., dynamic pricing. Customers then have three options: no-purchase, purchase at the (lowest) price o®ered by¯rm 1 or¯rm 2.
We need to impose a few conditions on the parameters of the choice model for our earlier results to go through: the weights are decreasing functions of the price, and w j p j is unimodal. For instance, the logit model with weights of the form e ¡p=¹ used in [1] (pg., 222) satis¯es this property. ¹ > 0 is a diversity factor that if close to zero, models customers indi®erent to the product characteristics and who buy based purely on price, whereas when ¹ is very high, they are quite indi®erent to price and buy each product with equal probability.
